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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	INITIALS	DATE
1	Mr. Bundy, ONE – info	DRB	11/1
2	Mr. Komer, O/DDI – info	RWK	12/1
3	Kathy – file		
4			
5			
6			

	ACTION		DIRECT REPLY		PREPARE REPLY
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Remarks:

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FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.	DATE
STAT O/DDI 354 Admin.	30 Nov 59

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Executive Registry
11-9521/a

30 November 1959

Honorable Henry M. Jackson
United States Senate
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Senator Jackson:

I have your letter asking me to comment on various questions relating to the improvement of State-Defense coordination in planning and executing national security policy.

After considerable reflection, I have decided that it would be inappropriate for me as an officer of another agency of the Government to respond formally to your inquiry. I have, as you know, met with you and your staff, and have endeavored to give you informally some of my thoughts on the topic of your letter and related matters. I am prepared to meet again with any member of your staff on the same basis but hope you will not regard it amiss that I prefer to go on the record, so to speak, only on matters falling within my responsibility--the furnishing of intelligence and estimates to the policymaking machinery.

With all good wishes,

Sincerely,

STAT

Robert Amory, Jr.
Deputy Director (Intelligence)

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United States Senate

COMMITTEE ON
GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS
SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL POLICY MACHINERY
(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 115, 86TH CONGRESS)

Executive Registry
11-9528

November 5, 1959

Mr. Robert Amory, Jr.

STAT

Dear Mr. Amory:

The work of the Subcommittee on National Policy Machinery has now reached the point where we are exploring in detail the major problem areas which appear to merit closer study.

One question, of central importance to our inquiry, concerns the matter of State-Defense coordination in planning and executing national security policy.

I am sending along with this letter a rather formidable series of questions related to this subject. Some of them lie within your area of particular experience; study and reflection may have led you to conclusions on others. I am hoping that you can give us your reactions to whatever questions stimulate you.

I thought an additional copy of our background memorandum for the study might be of assistance, so I am enclosing one.

With thanks for your help.

Sincerely yours,

Henry M. Jackson, U.S.S.
Chairman, Subcommittee on
National Policy Machinery

2 Enclosures

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Subcommittee on
National Policy Machinery

Staff Memorandum
November 1959

What Can Be Done to Improve State-Defense Coordination?

The task of planning and executing national security policy falls largely upon the Departments of State and Defense. It is therefore of prime importance to delineate properly the respective responsibilities of the two Departments, and to secure effective coordination in areas involving joint responsibility.

Some qualified observers state that too often our nation's political ends have been shaped to meet military means, rather than vice versa. Or else they maintain that the defense establishment has often been unable to secure adequate guidance concerning our foreign policy objectives when determining force levels and the composition of our weapons mix. They contend in addition that a failure to define more precisely the missions of the two Departments has led to a confusion of authority and responsibility, and in some cases a no man's land of decision-making.

The Subcommittee seeks answers to these specific questions:

1. Are the responsibilities of the State and Defense Departments in national security policy-making now correctly defined and divided? If not, what changes are needed?

2. Would a codification of the responsibilities of State and Defense be practical and desirable? If so, what might be its content?

3. What guidance does Defense need from State, and is it being provided? If not, what organizational changes might help State to provide, and Defense to receive, the needed guidance?

4. Similarly, what guidance does State need from Defense, and is it being provided? If not, what organizational changes might help Defense to provide, and State to receive, the needed guidance?

5. Many concerned with the above problems raise these more particular questions:

   a. What is the proper relationship between State and the Joint Chiefs of Staff (and/or the Joint Staff of the JCS)? Should a representative of the Secretary of State participate in discussions of the JCS (and/or joint staff groups) when appropriate?

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b. Should a representative of the JCS sit with the Policy Planning Staff of State (and/or other State Department groups)?

c. Is the responsibility of ISA now properly conceived? If not, what should it be?

d. Is there a need for a joint State-DOD-JCS Planning Staff? Can more and better use be made of ad hoc joint State-DOD-JCS task forces on special issues of national security policy?

e. Is more horizontal communication needed between State and Defense? If so, at what levels?

6. Should the Secretary of State be asked to testify in the Congress concerning foreign policy implications of the Defense budget? Should the Secretary of State be formally charged with more responsibility in connection with our defense posture and the Defense budget?

7. Would it be desirable to build into the State Department structure and staff, wider competence in military and scientific matters? In what other areas might it be particularly helpful to strengthen staff support for the Secretary of State? If so, what steps would help achieve these ends?

8. To diminish the negotiating burdens of the Secretary of State, would it be desirable to create a Secretary of Foreign Affairs, responsible to the Secretary of State, who could represent the United States at Foreign Ministers' meetings?

9. In what areas might it be desirable to strengthen staff support for the Secretary of Defense, and how might this be done?

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United States Senate

COMMITTEE ON
GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS
SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL POLICY MACHINERY
(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 115, 86TH CONGRESS)

October 1959

BACKGROUND MEMORANDUM ON

STUDY OF NATIONAL POLICY MACHINERY

In July, 1959, the Senate unanimously adopted S. Res. 115, which authorized the Subcommittee on National Policy Machinery of the Senate Government Operations Committee to study the effectiveness of existing government organizations and procedures for formulating and executing national security policy in the contest with world communism.

The inquiry now underway represents the first comprehensive review of national security policy-making machinery undertaken since the passage of the National Security Act of 1947. That Act, which created the Department of Defense and the National Security Council, was adopted before our nation as a whole, and our policy-makers in general, realized that the cold war would be the dominant fact of international life in our time.

The twelve years which have passed since the National Security Act of 1947 have seen world communism obliterate the traditional distinction between peace and war. World communism now challenges us all the time. The competition goes across the board -- it is military, industrial, scientific, political, ideological, cultural, and diplomatic.

It is now commonly accepted that the cold war may persist for 25 or 50 years into the future. The fundamental issue before the Subcommittee is this: How can we best organize for the long pull to generate the sustained national effort which will be needed to win out in the cold war? How can our free society so organize its human and material resources as to outthink, outplan, and outperform totalitarianism? How can our government best organize to formulate, and to translate into effective policies and programs, a coherent national strategy which has as its goal helping build a world community of peace, justice and order?

This study is not concerned with questions of substantive policy as such. It will not pass judgment, that is, on particular policy decisions made in the cold war. Rather, it is concerned with

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whether existing governmental machinery gives us the greatest possible likelihood of devising and successfully carrying out integrated and effective national security programs.

The Subcommittee is keenly aware that good policy-making machinery can never substitute for good leadership. It believes equally, however, that good organization can help and that poor organization hurts.

The Subcommittee is also aware of the Constitutional role of the President and the Executive Branch in the field of national security, and will be mindful of these prerogatives and responsibilities throughout its inquiry.

The Subcommittee assumes that there is no facile solution to the problem of building effective national security machinery, and would view with suspicion over-simplified remedies purporting to solve our difficulties through quick and easy modification of existing structures or procedures.

Finally, the Subcommittee assumes that we face a national problem, far transcending either political party or any particular administration. The President has pledged his cooperation with the Subcommittee's work. The views and considered opinions of appropriate officials in the Executive Branch are being actively sought and received. The study is being conducted throughout on a scholarly, objective and non-partisan basis.

The Subcommittee plans to spend much of the remainder of this year soliciting the views of numerous present and former government officials, and students of our national policy-making process. Formal hearings are anticipated early in the next session of the Congress. It is presumed that these hearings will be followed by a comprehensive report, containing findings and recommendations and any proposals for legislative action deemed appropriate.

The Subcommittee consists of Senator Henry M. Jackson, (D., Wash.), Chairman, and Senators Hubert Humphrey, (D., Minn.), and Karl Mundt, (R., S.D.).

The Subcommittee has already held more than 100 interviews with participants in or qualified observers of our policy-making process. It has also solicited in writing the views of twice that number of people. In addition, the Subcommittee has requested the Legislative Reference Service of the Library of Congress and several departments of the government to initiate studies or furnish background information relevant to the Subcommittee's work.

At this time, it is still too early to develop fixed ideas concerning improvements in our policy-making machinery. However, the

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Subcommittee staff has provisionally identified the following broad problem areas as meriting further systematic study. The questions which appear to warrant exploration will of course be revised as the inquiry proceeds.

1. What can be done to improve State-Defense coordination?

Some, observing that the main task of formulating national security policies must fall jointly upon the Departments of State and Defense, place great emphasis upon the proper integration of political ends and military means in establishing our national strategic objectives. They state that, too often, our nation's political ends have been shaped to meet military means, rather than vice versa. Or else they maintain that the defense establishment has often been unable to secure adequate guidance concerning our foreign policy objectives when determining force levels and the composition of our weapons mix. Those of this persuasion agree that State-Defense cooperation is now close on many specific policy issues and operational matters, but question whether the same coordination is reflected in broad strategic policies of great importance. If this is true, what corrective steps would be desirable?

2. What should be the role of the office of Secretary of State in relation to the President?

One school of thought suggests that the policy-making role of the office of the Secretary of State be redefined and enlarged. Some assert that his views should carry greater weight and authority in NSC deliberations. Others recommend that he be asked to testify concerning foreign policy implications of the defense budget. Yet others suggest that he be made the true "first officer" of the government, and advance proposals whereby he would be freed from the necessity of attending Foreign Ministers' meetings. Should the Secretary of State's role be enlarged? If so, in what manner?

3. How can the National Security Council best function?

Many suggestions have been made for improving the National Security Council - Operations Coordinating Board process. It is argued by some that NSC policy papers are sometimes so compromised and general as not to be useful guides for planning and action. Others believe that the NSC has grown too big; still others maintain that the NSC staff should be enlarged; yet others hold that the entire NSC-OCB process has become cumbersome and unwieldy. Another view is that the State and Defense Departments should have greater authority to initiate and present policy papers. Which criticisms, if any, are justified, and what form should remedial action take?

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4. What should be the role of the President's staff in national security policy-making?

Some maintain that a non-parochial national strategy and supporting policies can be made "only at the summit". They advance various suggestions for enlarging the advisory role of the President's staff. These include proposals to create new Special Assistants to the President, to enlarge the National Security Council staff, and to establish semi-autonomous operations research organizations whose studies would be available to the President's office. What are the merits and shortcomings of such suggestions?

5. Can we improve the system for the allocation of resources devoted to national security?

At any given level of expenditures for national security purposes, it is obviously impossible to satisfy every potentially worthwhile requirement. It is therefore vital that resources be allocated according to some set of priorities. Many contend that we do not now have an agreed-upon national strategy and that, as a result, it is impossible to establish priorities on an intelligent basis. Others hold that existing budgetary processes are not a responsive instrument for relating resource allocations to our national security objectives and policy. What steps would contribute to the more effective allocation of our resources?

6. Can better mechanisms be devised for increasing our ability to satisfy our national security requirements?

The larger our gross national product, the greater is our ability to meet the various private and public demands on the economy. In the past, however, economic growth and national security have not been clearly related in our policy making. As a result, some contend that our national security requirements and programs have not sufficiently reflected our ability to increase our gross national product, and to allocate in the process more resources for the needs of the cold war. Therefore, they continue, our forward planning suffers from unnecessary constraints. Some argue for a national economic budget, projecting the nation's economic growth for several years ahead on various assumptions about the nation's economic policies. What means might be found to relate considerations of economic growth more closely to national security policy?

7. How can we more closely integrate scientific research and development with our foreign policy objectives?

A growing number of observers single out the field of scientific research and development as one in which closer State-Defense

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cooperation is particularly required. They state that, too frequently, our foreign policy makers lack familiarity with the nature of our research and development programs, and the prospective political implications of weapons systems in the developmental stage. On the other hand, they assert, our research and development community does not ask the Department of State to comment upon the political desirability of its developmental programs, or to suggest new areas of technological exploration which might better further our foreign policy objectives. What can be done to effect closer cooperation?

8. How can the "committee system" be made to work more effectively?

Thousands of inter- and intra-departmental committees on all levels of decision-making are part of our machinery for formulating and executing national security policy. The complaint is often made that the committee system results in excessive compromises, diffuses responsibility, conceals or eliminates important policy alternatives before they are debated at appropriate levels, and excessively slows down the decision-making process. A typical proposed administrative reform would grant committee chairmen the power of decision, subject to appeal and review. Might the adoption of such or similar procedures be practical and beneficial?

9. How can we develop better policy-makers?

Some, while conceding the importance of good policy-making machinery, place equal or greater stress upon programs for increasing the skills, breadth, and insight of policy-makers themselves. They contend that existing career management programs within the Departments of State and Defense, and within the military services, need amendment if we are to produce senior policy-makers with the required breadth of experience and depth of view. One proposal calls for establishing a senior staff service, composed of a limited number of outstanding civilian employees and military officers who have followed career lines specifically designed to give them extensive operational experience outside their normal departments or services. The members of this senior staff might be given opportunities for special education and training both below and above the National War College level. Should this or similar career management programs be adopted?

10. What can be done about the high turnover of top policy-makers at the Senate confirmation level?

It is often contended that top policy-makers, particularly at the Assistant Secretary level, too often leave government service

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before they have mastered their jobs. Some seek means whereby candidates for such positions would give more explicit assurances of their willingness to serve for longer periods; other suggest we move closer to the British system of permanent departmental under secretaries. What suggestions have merit?

11. How can the scientist best play his vital part in the policy process?

The ever-growing role of science and the scientist in national security policy-making has created administrative problems of complexity and importance. For many years, we have experimented, both within the departments and the Executive Office, with various ad hoc arrangements designed to bring competent scientific advice to bear on policy at appropriate decision-making levels. Many express dissatisfaction with both past and present solutions to the problem. What improvements can be made?

12. Can better procedures be devised for assuring timely consideration of important facts, ideas and policy alternatives at appropriate government levels?

A common complaint is that informational channels within the government make for excessively long delays between the time when important new facts or policy and program alternatives are first developed outside or at lower echelons within the government, and the time when they are considered by top-level policy-makers. A similar complaint concerns informational barriers between departments. Some say that internal overclassification of information is an important source of the difficulty; others believe the Executive Branch should establish some watchdog group, charged with speeding the flow of important information to appropriate officials. What changes are desirable?

13. What contribution can "think groups" make to our problem?

Many recommend that semi-autonomous policy research organizations be established to assist either the Secretary of State or the President and the national security advisers in his office. These proposals range from creating a small academy, which might be available for dispassionate counsel on a limited number of policy issues of unusual complexity and importance, to establishing a large-scale, Rand-type organization, which might undertake or sponsor comprehensive research programs in a wide variety of fields relevant to national security. If it is desirable to create such groups, how broad should their mandate be, what degree of autonomy should they possess, and where might they best be placed in our organizational structure?

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14. Can better machinery or procedures be developed for helping promote wider public understanding of national security problems?

It is hardly necessary to state that only a well informed and understanding public can meet the demands made on it by a long-range cold war. Numerous students and officials seek ways to promote this understanding and obtain more meaningful public discussion of important national security issues. Some see a useful analogy in the annual report of the Council of Economic Advisers, which has served as an important vehicle for stimulating discussion of economic problems. They suggest the desirability of some counterpart report in the national security field, issued under different auspices. What steps can be taken in this area?

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Bill,

Quite forthright responses to a set of often fairly fuzzy questions; I heartily agree in general.

a. Above all, agree that it is hard to institutionalize State-Defense relationship. After all, much will depend on the personalities involved and not just at the senior level. I have always felt, for example, that there was far too much mutual distrust between the two (heard both Admiral Davis, former Director Joint Staff, and a senior action officer in Navy's Political Military Office -- OP 61 -- express rather emotional and cockeyed views along these lines).

b. Re State not giving adequate guidance to Defense, amen to your concern. State has, in a sense, abdicated this responsibility, and then complained at the inadequacy of the military posture to support our foreign policy. Hence, I think your answer to question 3 tends to argue with that to question 6. As State has long been unhappy with the lamentable state of our limited war capabilities, Secretary of State has an obligation to make this clear, not only to President and NSC, but to Congress and public if necessary (and it is).

c. Re question 4, from a good deal of contact at both ISA and service planning levels in past four years, I have developed a strong feeling that while ISA does have the charter, it's still forced to fight a running battle against the jealousies of the service staffs, who would prefer to ignore it. ISA is gradually winning this battle but could use a bigger stick. Perhaps budget cuts in service planning staffs could be used to accelerate transfer of responsibilities to ISA.

d. As for 5d, some "planning staff" seems to me to be desperately needed somewhere, because neither ISA nor JCS nor State really devote much attention at all to the problems of tomorrow, as opposed to those of today. I am not suggesting that we overemphasize long range planning, but the absolute lack of it in our current structure means that we are always ad hocing on a day-to-day basis instead of anticipating the major problems which even you and I could agree are looming clearly ahead. But for my money, some sort of an independent planning staff, perhaps attached to the NSC office, would be a better bet than that mentioned in 5d.

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e. On question 9, "Hear, hear" on [redacted] office, which really ought to be brought under ISA. Like your idea of hiking [redacted] job up a notch, as would permit him to argue Defense's point of view more articulately with State and vice versa, as well as giving him bigger stick against services.

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